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The Law is a Fractal:                                              
The Attempt to Anticipate Everything 
Andrew Morrison Stumpff*© 2013 
INTRODUCTION 
 “And they say he’s a skillful commander,” rejoined Pierre. 
 “I don’t understand what is meant by ‘a skillful commander,’” 
replied Prince André ironically. 
 “A skillful commander?” replied Pierre. “Why, one who foresees 
all contingencies . . . and foresees the adversary’s intentions.” 
 “But that’s impossible,” said Prince André as if it were a matter 
settled long ago. 
 – Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, 1869 
 
 No man is so wise as to be able to take account of every single 
case, wherefore he is not able sufficiently to express in words all those 
things that are suitable for the end he has in view.  And even if a 
lawgiver were able to take all the cases into consideration, he ought 
not to mention them all in order to avoid confusion. 
 – Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, ca. 1270 
 
Define an inappropriate rule as a rule that, if followed literally, would 
in at least some cases produce results that can be concluded with 
reasonable certainty to have been unintended by and unacceptable to 
even the rule’s author.  Even under this definition, it is impossible for a 
rule writer to write an appropriate and objective rule to cover every 
situation in advance.  Rule writers nonetheless act today as though they 
were unaware of this long-acknowledged impossibility of perfect 
 
* Lecturer, University of Michigan Law School; Adjunct Professor, University of Alabama 
Law School.  The author thanks Professors Brendan Maher, Andrew Oringer, and Frederick 
Schauer; Mark Schwimmer; participants in the Seventh Annual Labor and Employment Law 
Colloquium hosted by Loyola University Chicago Law School and Northwestern University 
School of Law in September 2012; as well as those present for a University of Michigan Law 
School faculty presentation in March 2012 for their helpful comments on this Article.  In 
addition, the author thanks the University of Michigan Law Library staff, especially Seth 
Quidachay-Swan, for research assistance.  
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advance enumeration, and their persistent attempts to achieve it have 
imposed enormous, under-recognized costs on regulated populations. 
I. THE NUMBER LINE 
It is impossible, even in principle, to write an appropriate, objective, 
and specific rule for every imaginable situation.  In this way, the law 
resembles certain mathematical phenomena.1 
For example, take any two points on the number line—say, the points 
corresponding to the numbers one and two—and ask: How many points 
lie between them?  The answer, of course, is that an infinite number of 
points lie between one and two on the number line.  Indeed, it can be 
proven that as many points lie between one and two on the number line 
as exist on the entire number line itself, extending forever in both 
directions.2  The same is true between any other two points—even two 
points that seem very close together, like 1 and 1.00000000001.3  In 
other words, there is no such thing as two points that are “next to” each 
other on the number line. 
From a certain vantage, legal rules are analogous. Imagine, for 
example, that instead of a number line we were considering a collection 
of unique4 factual scenarios and a rule that assigned legal consequences 
to each of those scenarios.  For instance, we might consider a municipal 
park for which a city had adopted the rule, “no vehicles are allowed in 
the park.”  We could treat “Point 1” on the number line as representing 
the act of driving a car through the park and “Point 2” as representing 
refraining from driving a car through the park.  The rule would assign 
 
1. Surprisingly, there is a slightly fraught history associated with the invocation of 
mathematical principles even by analogy in legal scholarship.  See David R. Dow, Gödel and 
Langdell—A Reply to Brown and Greenberg’s Use of Mathematics in Legal Theory, 44 
HASTINGS L.J. 707, 724 (1993); Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Venn Diagram of Business Lawyering 
Judgments: Toward a Theory of Practical Metadisciplinarity, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 44 
n.169 (2011) and sources cited therein.  This issue is further addressed in note 116, infra.  But to 
forestall objections at the outset, I note here that this Article will not make any sort of general 
claim that “the law” is a “system” in the way mathematics is an analytic system; instead, it merely 
observes that certain specific facets of mathematics are conceptually similar to, and therefore 
potentially illustrative of, certain facets of rulemaking. 
2. For an accessible proof as well as an entertaining discussion of this and similar phenomena, 
see DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, EVERYTHING AND MORE: A COMPACT HISTORY OF INFINITY 
123–24 (2003). 
3. Because, of course, you can simply keep adding to the lower number digits that are to the 
right of the last non-zero decimal position of the higher number, forever.  For example, 
1.0000000000005 is between the two numbers given in the text, as is 1.0000000000055. 
4. Here, “unique” means “relevantly unique,” which is to say, different from every other fact 
pattern in at least one respect that could matter to legal consequences. 
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the label of “illegal” to Point 1 and “legal” to Point 2.5 
As has been famously pointed out,6 these two points and the rule 
itself are insufficient to cover all the specific factual situations that 
might arise involving vehicles in a park.  At least they are insufficient in 
any reasonable rule system.7  What if, for example, a police vehicle has 
to enter the park on an emergency call?  If we want an appropriate, 
specific rule, we would need another point, between Points 1 and 2, 
corresponding to the factual scenario, “A police vehicle entering the 
park.”  Point 1.5, let’s call it, to which we would assign, like Point 2, the 
label “legal.”  But what if the driver of the car were a thief who had 
stolen it from the police?  That specific scenario would fall between 
Points 1 and 1.5, perhaps 1.2, and would be assigned the label 
 
5. Technical terms are “protasis”—the factual predicate for a rule’s application—and 
“apodasis”—the consequence the rule applies to the protasis.  FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY 
THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND 
IN LIFE 23 (1993) [hereinafter SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES].  In the context of the number 
line analogy, points on the line represent protases, and the labels we assign to those points (e.g., 
“illegal; punished by fine”) represent apodases.  Professor Schauer observes that all rules can be 
transposed into the form: “All X’s must [not]/[may] Ø,” where “X” is the rule’s protasis and “Ø” 
the apodasis (in this case rendering X as an actor doing or being a certain thing, and Ø as an 
action, such as “pay a fine”).  Id. at 44.  Extending the mathematical metaphor, a rule could be 
thought of as a “function” that assigns to each protasis one and only one apodasis. 
6. The “no vehicles are allowed in the park” example was first raised by H. L. A. Hart and has 
since been discussed by a long succession of legal philosophers, including (most prominently) 
Lon Fuller.  See H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 593, 606–15 (1958) [hereinafter Hart, Positivism]; Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to 
Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 663 (1958).  For a history of the “no 
vehicles in the park” example and cites to its many invocations, see Frederick Schauer, A Critical 
Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109, 1111 n.10 (2008) [hereinafter Schauer, A 
Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park].   
 More recently, the example found its way into Chief Justice Roberts’s high-profile opinion 
upholding the Obama administration’s health care reform legislation, employed to support the 
point that the words of a rule, such as the Constitutional grant to Congress of the taxation power, 
do not necessarily by themselves inexorably provide answers to every specific question.  Nat’l 
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012).  “Vehicles in the park” also 
figured in the recent unpleasant exchange between Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia and 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Richard Posner.  See Richard A. Posner, The 
Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 2012, at 18 [hereinafter Posner, 
The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia]; Richard A. Posner, Richard Posner Responds to Antonin 
Scalia’s Accusation of Lying, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.tnr.com/ 
blog/plank/107549/richard-posner-responds-antonin-scalias-accusation-lying#. 
7. Of course, saying a rule is “not reasonable” or “not appropriate” begs a number of 
questions, starting with, “To whom?”  For purposes of this Article, an “unreasonable” or 
“inappropriate” rule can be defined narrowly to mean that following the rule literally would, in at 
least some cases, produce results that can be concluded with reasonable certainty to have been 
unintended by, and unacceptable to, even the rule’s author.  For further discussion, see notes 31 
and 37 infra. 
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“illegal.”8 
And so on.  Given the numberless potential variations, foreseeable 
and unforeseeable, in “vehicles,” motives, and circumstances, there can, 
provably,9 be no end to the possible specific scenarios—and thus no 
limit on the number of rules that would result from trying to write an 
appropriate one for each possible, distinct fact situation.10 
The same is true for any rule system.  It suffices to consider as a 
second illustrative example a rule prohibiting the killing of another 
human being.  To trace for a short distance a single one of the many 
branching, relevantly different categories of conceivable fact patterns: A 
person might kill another in claimed self-defense, where the killer had 
been attacked by his victim, who was holding a gun.  Or instead the 
victim might have been threatening the killer with a large knife, or a 
penknife, or with a viola.  If the goal is to have a separate, perfectly 
 
8. A possibly more intuitively accurate way to conceptualize combinations of facts would be 
by plotting them not on a line but rather on a multi-dimensional grid, with a dimension for every 
possible fact-type.  For example, the point just described could be located in three dimensions, 
with one dimension corresponding to whether the vehicle was inside or outside the park, a second 
to whether the vehicle was or was not an emergency vehicle, and the third to whether the vehicle 
had been stolen.  But aside from the problem that dimensions greater than three cannot be 
humanly pictured, it can, in any case, be proven that there exists a one-dimensional number line 
point corresponding to every point in multi-dimensional space, no matter how great the number 
of dimensions.  WALLACE, supra note 2, at 260–63 (describing the original proof by 
mathematician Georg Cantor).  So the number line works just as well theoretically. 
9. It is trivial to prove, for any act or behavior of interest, that an infinite number of different 
possible associated fact patterns exist; just keep adding a new assumed person, place, or 
circumstance to the starting hypothetical (omitting the literally unforeseeable scenarios involving 
some idea or object that has yet to be invented or discovered at the time of enumeration but will 
be in the future).  See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 125–26 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW] (pointing out the degree to which future circumstances cannot be 
anticipated by the writer of a rule).  A rigorous proof that an infinite number of relevantly 
different factual scenarios always exist would be much more difficult, perhaps impossible.  I am, 
however, inclined to believe that whether provable, the assertion is nevertheless true, if only 
because of the possibility of unanticipated future developments.  See SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE 
RULES, supra note 5, at 83 (“Suppose there existed a rule of great specificity, crafted in such a 
way as to incorporate within the rule every conceivable relevant distinction and qualification.  
Such a rule would, from the perspective of whatever background justification or justifications 
informed the creation of the rule and its qualifications, correctly decide every case. . . .  It might 
still turn out that some new and heretofore unexpected event arose, such that now the application 
of the highly specific rule generated a result inconsistent with the specific rule’s background 
justification.”). 
10. Stated differently, there are always an infinite number of different “protases.”  See supra 
note 5 (explaining the term “protasis”).  For some of the possibilities involving vehicles in the 
park—which include (among others) a person riding a bicycle in the park, the building of a war 
memorial in the park that incorporates an actual Jeep, a fire truck passing through the park as part 
of a municipal parade, and a toy electric car—see Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the 
Park, supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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specific advance rule for every situation, again, that goal is not 
attainable.11  Writing an exhaustive set of specific and appropriate rules 
in any context is equivalent to assigning labels to all the points on the 
number line; that is to say, it is literally an infinite task.12 
II. THE FRACTAL 
The number line, being one-dimensional, is not the perfect metaphor 
for rules.  We more naturally think of rules as defining an “area” of 
conduct that is legal and a “border” between what is legal and illegal.  
(Hence the phrase “bright-line rule.”)  Thus a two-dimensional analogy 
better reflects intuition.  Employing this metaphor, we say that 
everything “within the border” of the area of proscribed conduct is 
illegal, and everything outside is legal. 
FIGURE 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this model of a rule, the idea of an infinitely large number of 
relevantly different factual scenarios is represented in a different way: 
by the area’s border having an infinitely complicated shape. 
For example, consider again the rule, “no vehicles in the park.”  A 
simple rule like this could be visualized as denoting an area with a 
simple shape, like the rectangle above.  Then the exception for police 
vehicles would involve introducing a complication to the border—that 
is, making legal a small portion of what would otherwise be illegal: 
 
11. For another instructive example, consider the difficulties associated with legally defining 
the word “sandwich.”  Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, supra note 6, at 20. 
12. Here we must stipulate, in a point to which we shall return, that if a rule is subjective 
enough it can theoretically appropriately cover every situation in a finite way.  For example: “A 
person is guilty of murder if that is appropriate under the circumstances.”  But such a subjective 
rule is, to a greater or lesser degree depending upon one’s philosophy and ideology, disfavored on 
predictability, rule-of-law, and other grounds, all of which are the subject of extensive discussion 
in Part IV.  This Article is about the attempt to write rules that cover every fact situation but leave 
no room for subjectivity.  This Article concerns rules a rule writer intends to be “formally 
realizable,” in Duncan Kennedy’s phrase.  Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687–88 (1976). 
All points inside the designated area are “illegal” 
AREA  
OF 
ILLEGALITY 
 
All the points outside 
the designated area 
are “legal” 
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FIGURE 2 
 
 
 
 
 
But, as noted above, an exception to that exception would be necessary 
for stolen police vehicles: 
FIGURE 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
And so on, with an infinite number of potentially necessary rule 
refinements and exceptions, ultimately resulting in an infinitely intricate 
border that separates the legal from the illegal. 
It happens that a corresponding mathematical construct, the “fractal,” 
has been developed to capture just this idea.  This concept was 
described, and the term invented, relatively recently (in mathematics 
history terms) by the French-American mathematician Benoit 
Mandelbrot.13  A fractal is a type of shape whose contour is infinitely 
complicated.14  The commonly offered natural example (as represented 
in Figure 4) is that of any terrestrial coastline.  The coast of England as 
seen from Earth’s orbit, for instance, looks generally jagged, unsmooth; 
although, you can pick out short stretches that appear from that distance 
to be simple curves or lines.  If you zoom in, however, to an altitude of, 
say, 5000 meters, those previously small and apparently smooth 
stretches of coast are in fact also revealed to be intricate and jagged, 
with inlets and rocky outcrops—although, there will, again, be visible 
 
13. See generally BENOIT B. MANDELBROT, THE FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF NATURE (1977) 
(introducing the term “fractal” and explaining how nature’s shapes differ from ordinary geometric 
shapes due to fractal geometry). 
14. Id. at 14–15.  The fractal idea has previously been analogized to legal issues, but in rather 
different ways than that outlined here.  See David G. Post & Michael B. Eisen, How Long Is the 
Coastline of the Law? Thoughts on the Fractal Nature of Legal Systems, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 545 
(2000) (describing the fractal quality of legal citation patterns); Alan L. Durham, The Fractal 
Geometry of Invention, 53 B.C. L. REV. 489 (2012) (contending that the process of invention has 
a fractal nature). 
Exception (to the 
exception) for 
police vehicles 
AREA  
OF 
ILLEGALITY 
AREA  
OF 
ILLEGALITY Exception for 
police vehicles 
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some seemingly smooth short segments.  Successive magnifications 
produce the same results.  A photo taken ten centimeters from the edge 
of a clod of dirt reveals about the same relative degree and type of 
jaggedness—of complexity—as a photo of the entire coastline of 
England taken from space.  Eventually you can magnify down to the 
level of atoms and electrons and quarks without encountering a 
verifiably “smooth” surface. 
FIGURE 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A fractal shape, then, is “scale-insensitive”—its relative complexity is 
the same regardless of scale. 
It is possible to write a mathematical formula that, when graphed, 
also has this same property at literally every scale.15  From a distance, 
such a shape looks as though it were merely a complicated curve, but as 
you close in, no “curve” can ultimately be identified.  In fact, the graph 
of a fractal can never actually be drawn; it can only be approximated.  
The shape of a fractal cannot—even at infinite magnification—be fully 
resolved.16  Figure 5 below shows the first few successive 
magnifications of a small portion of the border of such a fractal shape.17 
 
 
 
  
 
15. MANDELBROT, supra note 13, at 180–92. 
16. For mesmerizing illustrations and animations of fractals, see Video, FRACTAL FOUND., 
www.fractalfoundation.org/videos/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2012). 
17. This diagram represents a graph of the equations known as the “Mandelbrot set.”  
MANDELBROT, supra note 13, at 188. 
 
 
 
 
Coastline Magnification 
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FIGURE 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This means that if you have a region bounded by a fractal, you would, 
up close, look in vain for the region’s “border.”  The border of a region 
enclosed by a fractal—in the sense of any sort of identifiable line or 
curve, rather than a collection of an infinite number of tinier and tinier 
inlets and bays, whose ultimate contours you can never discover—does 
not actually exist.  To be sure, most points on the plane are readily 
identifiable as being either inside such a shape or outside it.  But the 
precise, local edge between “inside” and “outside” is no more locatable 
than the end of a rainbow.18 
As observers have understood for millennia,19 with rules there can 
similarly never be, as a matter of principle, perfect resolution (in this 
sense of the term “resolution”).  No precise, definite border can exist 
between all the possible specific actions microscopically on this side of 
that which is appropriately legal and all the possible specific actions 
microscopically on the other side.20  One can always—forever—find, 
by adding new facts and circumstances, some new unresolved “gray 
area” that exists between the regions of fact-space previously resolved 
by rules.  The law is a fractal. 
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RULE PHILOSOPHY 
Given that you cannot write an appropriate specific rule in advance 
 
18. Both the number line and the fractal involve ultimately the same analogy: that of each 
specific factual situation to a single dimensionless mathematical point.  No matter how many 
individual discrete points one identifies and marks, there will always be infinite empty space left, 
whether in one or two dimensions.  Fractals also exist in three or more dimensions.  See 
MANDELBROT, supra note 13, at 142–45, 264–65.  The surface of a mountain range has been 
identified as a fractal shape, for instance.  So the legal analogy could just as easily be to a volume 
of space within which conduct is illegal.  A simple rule like “no vehicles in the park” could then 
be visualized as something like a cube. 
19. See infra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. 
20. Another way of stating that the border between legal and illegal is infinitely complicated is 
to say that any finite, specific, unambiguous, and appropriate rule system must be “incomplete.”  
As Professor Schauer points out, the law uses vagueness to avoid this incompleteness.  Frederick 
Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 536 (1988) [hereinafter Schauer, Formalism].  See 
related discussion at note 12, supra, and accompanying text. 
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that will spell out what to do in every conceivable future scenario, a 
question arises as to how hard you should try.  In particular (so to 
speak), how general or specific should you be?  Is it better, in some 
sense, for a legislature simply to promulgate a vague rule—e.g., “killing 
another human is illegal, unless the killer has an adequate reason for 
doing so”—or should the legislature instead try to enumerate the ten 
thousand or so specific scenarios that seem most likely to arise, and 
write a rule for each one of them?  Or as another alternative, should the 
legislature try for a few moderately general rules that are as objectively 
clear as possible—e.g., “killing another human is illegal, unless the 
victim was within three feet of and pointing a knife at, or within fifty 
feet of and pointing a loaded gun at, the killer”? 
Questions like these are of interest.  A centuries-long, multifaceted 
legal-philosophical debate—arguably the legal-philosophical debate—
has played out over “rules” and “standards,” and related problems such 
as whether rules can or should be “determinate” in the sense that they 
actually can or should constrain decision makers. Writers have 
considered, among other things, whether it is better, or more just, or 
more predictable for legislatures to spell out as much as possible in 
advance, or instead simply to repose discretion in the eventual decision 
maker (or, indeed, whether the eventual decision maker always 
effectively does have discretion, whatever the legislature intends or 
says).  This discussion reaches back to ancient Greece and continues 
today, by way of Oliver Wendell Homes, Legal Realism, H. L. A. Hart, 
and Critical Legal Studies. 
A summary of what could be called “the philosophy of rule 
specificity,” insofar as relevant to present purposes,21 might begin with 
the year 350 BCE, when Aristotle expressed his opinion that at least in 
certain contexts, a general rule can never be appropriate for every 
specific case: “[A]ll law is universal but about some things it is not 
possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct.”22 
To what extent the lawmakers of antiquity and the early Middle Ages 
 
21. Obviously the short description that follows of several thousand years of scholarship is 
grossly oversimplified and incomplete, but perhaps excusably so for an article the principal point 
of which will be that complete detail is an inadvisable and always unattainable goal. 
22. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. V, ch. 10, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 935, 
1020 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941).  Aristotle’s sentiment was foreshadowed even earlier by his 
teacher Plato.  See PLATO, STATESMAN 314–15 (Raymond Klibansky & Elizabeth Anscombe 
eds., 1961) (“A law can never be precise enough to cover what is perfectly good and right for all 
and issue the best command to everyone at once.  The dissimilarities between the persons and 
their activities and the all but incessant mutability of human things forbid any art whatsoever to 
lay down any simple regulation on any matter which shall apply to all cases for all time.”). 
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were aware of Aristotle’s cautionary observation or accounted for it in 
their rulemaking is difficult to say.  We do know that 1500 years later, 
St. Thomas Aquinas found it necessary to make the statements 
employed as this Article’s second epigraph, to the effect that for a 
lawgiver to describe all possible cases in advance would be both (1) 
impossible, and anyway, (2) not a good idea.23  From there, one begins 
to find in the historical record references to problems of generality and 
specificity that become, along with extant published legal philosophy 
generally, more frequent. 
In the late nineteenth century, Oliver Wendell Holmes discussed 
specificity in the development of the common law.  He suggested a 
general rule or standard would always be available as a default principle 
when a rule of more specific application could not be found—that is, 
even if a specific rule were not provided for every situation, that would 
not mean some rule did not apply to every case.24  But Holmes observed 
that this truth did not seem universally recognized: 
There is a story of a Vermont justice of the peace before whom a suit 
was brought by one farmer against another for breaking a churn.  The 
justice took time to consider, and then said that he had looked through 
the statutes and could find nothing about churns, and gave judgment 
for the defendant.25 
By 1933, Roscoe Pound had constructed a hierarchy, based more or 
less on specificity, of types of legal guidelines, ascending from “rules” 
through “principles,” “conceptions,” and “doctrines,” and ending with 
the most general category, “standards,” the latter of which he offered 
the “reasonable prudent man” as an example.26  Other twentieth century 
writers vigorously took up the discussion of this “rules-standards” 
spectrum.27 
 
23. THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologica, pts. I–II, q. 96, art. 6, reply obj. 3, in THE 
POLITICAL IDEAS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 77 (Dino Bigongiari ed., 1953). 
24. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 474–75 (1897). 
25. Id. at 474.  
26. Roscoe Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law, 7 TUL. L. 
REV. 475, 482–85 (1933).  Pound defined rules as “precepts attaching a definite legal 
consequence to a definite, detailed state of facts.”  Id. at 482.  Pound was not entirely clear about 
whether his categories were meant to distinguish among rules on the basis of specificity or 
objectivity, which are two different criteria.  See infra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.  In 
any case, Pound took the position that precise rules are better for governing business transactions 
and vague standards for governing “human conduct,” of which he apparently did not consider 
business transactions to be a subset.  See Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1702–05 (collecting 
situations for which, variously, rules or standards have since been argued to be most appropriate). 
27. See, e.g., HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 9, at 127–30; Ronald M. Dworkin, 
The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 19 (1967); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 
CAL. L. REV. 955, 964–65 (1995); Daniel J. Gifford, Communication of Legal Standards, Policy 
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In 1958, H. L. A. Hart addressed himself to the problem of “vehicles 
in the park.”28  That such a simple prohibition could give rise to so 
many interpretive difficulties led Hart to conjecture that any rule—
while it may have a “core of settled meaning”—at its margins would 
inevitably be characterized by “a penumbra of debatable cases.”29  As 
another term for this “penumbra,” Hart (borrowing from the existing 
terminology of linguistic philosophy) described the problem of the 
difficult rule border as the “open texture of the law”—as in a law’s 
having an area of clear cases and a “fringe of open texture.”30  
 
Development, and Effective Conduct Regulation, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 409 (1971); Kennedy, 
supra note 12, at 1687–88 and sources cited therein.  Despite the apparent views of many 
academics, it would appear that no meaningful distinction can be drawn between rules and 
standards or any categories in between.  It is only possible to distinguish among relative degrees 
of precision or imprecision.  To call one thing a “rule” and another a “standard” is merely to make 
a comparison, an assertion that the first is more specific than the second.  The philosopher 
Ludwig Wittgenstein observed that in the end the word “‘inexact’ is just a reproach, and ‘exact’ is 
praise.”  LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, ¶ 88, at 42 (G. E. M. 
Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1953).  Ronald Dworkin is an exemplar of a contrasting approach.  He 
seems to think of a “principle” as an entirely different type of thing than a “rule.”  Dworkin, 
supra, at 22–23.  But what Dworkin distinguishes as principles could just as easily be described 
as default rules, implicitly preceded by the phrase: “If no more specific rule applies, then . . .”  
See RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 239 (1990) [hereinafter POSNER, THE 
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE] (criticizing Dworkin’s “arbitrary” distinctions).  To be sure, it is 
nearly always unclear which principle has precedence in a given case or how much weight a 
particular principle is to be given relative to others, but those are merely instances of rule 
ambiguity, not of a thing’s failure to be a rule.  Meanwhile, Posner also struggles objectively to 
distinguish rules from standards.  He and his coauthor Isaac Ehrlich have defined a “standard,” 
somewhat incoherently, as both a criterion (e.g., “efficiency”) and as a vague rule.  Isaac Ehrlich 
& Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 258 
(1974).  Casting something as a criterion likewise does not distinguish it from a rule.  In this 
context, a criterion can always be restated as a rule of the form: “[T]ake the approach that 
maximizes [the criterion].”  That a standard or a criterion is not phrased explicitly as a rule (e.g., 
“the prudent man” or “economic efficiency”) does not alter its essential equivalence to a rule, 
since, as used, both standards and criteria can always be transposed into the usual form of rules 
by supplying words that are implicit.  All in all, then, there seems to be just one category—
“rules”—of which some are more or less general or subjective than others. 
28. As discussed at note 6, supra. 
29. Hart, Positivism, supra note 6, at 607–08 (emphasis added).  “Penumbra” later achieved 
some fame or infamy in the line of Supreme Court privacy right cases.  See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).  Also similar is 
Professor Schauer’s characterization of the language of a rule as a “frame,” inside and outside of 
which are easy cases, but the very edge of which language may not fully delineate.  Frederick 
Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 430–35 (1985) [hereinafter Schauer, Easy Cases]. 
30. “Whichever device, precedent or legislation, is chosen for the communication of standards 
of behavior, these, however smoothly they work over the great mass of ordinary cases, will, at 
some point where their application is in question, prove indeterminate; they will have what has 
been termed an open texture.”  HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 9, at 124 (emphasis 
added).  See also id. at 130.  The term “open texture” was originally used by the philosopher 
Friedrich Waismann.  Friedrich Waismann, Verifiability, 19 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 119, 
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“Penumbra,” “open texture,” and “fringe” are all physical, shape-based 
rule analogies that, among other things, accurately describe the borders 
of a fractal.31 
More recently, Frederick Schauer restated the problem in terms of 
“easy cases” and “hard cases.”32  Hard cases for this purpose involve an 
objective, clear rule—e.g., “no vehicles allowed in the park”—applied 
to a specific factual situation where that rule gives an unacceptable 
answer, such as a police car responding to an emergency.33  Schauer 
 
121 (Supp. 1945).  Professor Schauer takes care to point out that despite common misperceptions, 
“open texture” does not refer to vagueness but rather to the inability to anticipate.  SCHAUER, 
PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 5, at 35–37.  Schauer unpersuasively divides the open 
texture problem into three supposedly different types of “recalcitrant experience”: the first, in 
which a simple, clear rule is known to be right for most cases but can be predicted to be wrong for 
a few; a second, in which unanticipated developments arise to render the rule incorrect; and a 
third, in which some circumstance not initially supposed to have been relevant turns out to be 
relevant.  Id. at 37–39.  But the third of these is a subset of the second, and the first two could 
simply be summarized as foreseeable and unforeseeable open texture.  
31. See also the “fuzzy edges” described by Dworkin, supra note 27, at 18.  At this point, a 
distinction must be emphasized between an existing rule, on the one hand, and a concept to which 
a rule writer seeks to give expression, on the other.  Precisely speaking, it is the latter that this 
Article contends always has “open texture” and a fractal quality.  Hart did not carefully 
distinguish between these two things, and Professor Schauer has persuasively argued that Hart 
was wrong to suggest that existing rules themselves have open texture—or at least that they have 
any open texture beyond that inherent in the language itself with which the rules are written.  
Frederick Schauer, On the Open Texture of Law, 86 GRAZIER PHILOSOPHISCHE STUDIEN 
(forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Schauer, Open Texture], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1926855.  See also Brian Bix, H. L. A. Hart and the “Open Texture” of 
Language, 10 LAW AND PHIL. 51, 68–70 (1991) (noting the lack of distinction in Hart’s work 
between the meaning of words and the meaning intended by the words’ speaker). The limited 
definition of “appropriate” adopted above at note 7, supra, follows from this Article’s focus on 
the rule writer’s perspective.  A strict definition of a “hard case,” infra note 33, can similarly 
follow: A factual scenario for which the result of applying an objective rule as written would be 
an outcome known with reasonable certainty to have been unintended by and unacceptable to 
even the rule’s author.   
32. See generally Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 29 (delineating “easy cases” and “hard 
cases” within the context of constitutional theory).  See also Frederick Schauer, The Generality of 
Law, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 217, 224–26 (2004) [hereinafter Schauer, The Generality of Law] 
(noting the disproportionate focus of legal scholarship on those relatively few cases whose 
difficulty ultimately requires resort to a judicial opinion).  The point was previously made by 
Hart.  HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 9, at 124–30.  The existence of easy cases 
permits Schauer to show that rules have at least some determinacy—that Realists and others 
cannot be right in suggesting that words can have no constraining effect on judges.  See also John 
A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity & Fairness, 68 WASH. L. REV. 1, 28–34 (1993) (discussing 
the implications of “easy tax cases” for the determinacy of tax law).  
33. Another favorite example is the grandson who the letter of the law clearly says should 
inherit from the grandparent he has killed.  Schauer, The Generality of Law, supra note 32, at 
226–27; Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, supra note 6, at 23; Dworkin, supra note 27, 
at 23–24.  For a recent example of a hard case in the employee benefits law area, where even one 
of the country’s leading “textualists” felt compelled to ignore the bright-line rule, see generally 
Julie A. Roin, The Limits of Textualism: Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan, 77 U. CHI. L. 
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observed that the overwhelming majority of cases that actually arise in 
the world are, to the contrary, easy cases—e.g., civilian cars driving 
inside the park for no good reason, or, much more numerous still, all 
cars driving outside the park—and therefore that much of the 
philosophical reaction to the existence of hard cases is overwrought.34 
But it nevertheless remains true there will always be some hard cases.  
Attempts to eliminate in advance all hard cases are frustrated, every 
time, by the problem of the fractal border.35  The only difficulty-free 
alternative is the unavailable one identified by Plato of entrusting all 
power to a perfectly enlightened despot to decide each case as it 
arises.36  The phenomenon with which all these writers have ultimately 
struggled is that two things are simultaneously true: (1) it is always 
possible, and even likely, to have mostly easy cases on both sides of a 
rule’s border; and yet (2) it is always impossible to locate that border, in 
 
REV. 1195 (2010) (describing the decision of Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal Judge Frank 
Easterbrook to ignore clear statutory text in favor of a more reasonable result).  The existence of 
such hard cases, in which an existing rule encounters factual scenarios where the rule cannot 
reasonably be followed, led Aquinas to his observations about the impossibility of exhaustive 
rulemaking.  AQUINAS, supra note 23, at 76–77.  Dworkin describes the problem of the hard case 
as the inability to “enumerate all the situations where the principle trumps the rule.”  Dworkin, 
supra note 27, at 26.  Schauer takes the position that there are in fact not one but four types of 
“hard cases”: (1) where the rule is too vague, incoherent, or opaque; (2) where the result of a clear 
rule conflicts with the rule’s purpose; (3) where two inconsistent rules apply; and (4) where a 
clear rule gives a result that is “hard to swallow.”  Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 29, at 414–16.  
But type number 3 is a special case of type number 1, and number 4 is a restatement or 
enlargement of number 2.  Meanwhile, type number 1, the unclear rule, is only hard in the sense 
that it makes things difficult for the judge, who will do his or her best, and the most that can be 
said is that other judges or observers might disagree with the result.  Really there is only one type 
of “hard case”—Schauer’s type number 2—in the intractable sense that the judge is faced with 
the strict choice between following a clear, authoritative rule to produce an unacceptable result or 
embarking on a course over whose legitimacy philosophers agonize. 
34. Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 29, at 420–23.  Schauer also criticizes Realists’ reasoning 
from “weird cases” to conclude that words cannot constrain judges.  Id.  Weird cases are 
particularly unlikely combinations of facts that create the unforeseen need for exceptions or for 
exceptions-to-exceptions.  An example might be the stolen police car in the park.  Stated another 
way, weird cases are the ones that turn up when we magnify a rule’s fractal border. 
35. “Hard cases make bad law,” as the legal maxim has it, because those are the cases at the 
fractal edge—they call for creating a new wrinkle in a previously smooth section of border.  
Further wrinkles will ultimately have to be made within that new wrinkle.  A simple rule like “no 
vehicles in the park” gives rise to many hard cases just because it is simple and therefore lacking, 
from the outset, in obviously necessary exceptions.  As one writer has put it, “rules that are 
simple because they are arbitrary will not withstand . . . pressure for fairness.  The simple rule 
will give way to the complex as soon as the unfairnesses inherent in the simple rule are discerned 
and the pressure is exerted.”  Stanley S. Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The 
Problem of the Management of Tax Detail, 34 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 673, 700 (1969). 
36. Acknowledging that such an ideal “scientific statesman” could never be, Plato sought to 
understand and describe other forms of government, such as popular democracy, as “counterfeits” 
for this hypothetical ruler.  PLATO, supra note 22, at 314–29. 
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advance, in a sufficiently precise way to avoid all potential hard cases—
because the number of the latter is infinite.37 
IV. GENERALITY AND AMBIGUITY 
Duncan Kennedy, among others, points out two different things that 
should be—but often, in the literature, do not seem to be—recognized 
as distinct.  As discussed above, one identifiable continuum of rule 
styles runs from “generality” to “specificity.”  But there also exists a 
different continuum, running from “subjectivity” to “objectivity.”  
Kennedy’s term for this second continuum is the degree to which a rule 
is “formally realizable.”38  For example, a highly formally realizable 
rule is: “Driving faster than 55 mph is always illegal; and driving less 
rapidly than 55 mph is always legal.”  A highly non-formally realizable 
(or subjective) rule would be: “Driving in a safe manner is always legal, 
and driving in an unsafe manner is always illegal.”39 
The general-specific dimension is different from the objective-
subjective dimension.  A rule’s generality refers to the range of 
situations to which the rule applies, which is not the same as the rule’s 
objectivity.40  A rule of very general application can be either objective 
 
  37. This Article has nothing to say about the perhaps principal preoccupation of those writing 
about hard cases, which is what a judge should do when confronted with one.  Writers have 
adopted one of two general points of view: that the judge should follow the rule; or that the judge 
should not follow the rule, by “making new law” or applying some overriding principle.  Hart and 
many others fall into the latter camp (but on grounds that vary widely).  Professor Schauer is 
generally in the former camp, arguing that the tendency of a clear, so-called “arbitrary” rule to 
collect unlike situations and treat them similarly is the very characteristic that makes a rule a rule, 
and that we have compelling reasons to apply a principle that respects rules, qua rules.  Schauer, 
Open Texture, supra note 31, manuscript at 24; SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 5, 
at 18.  Under this view, the rule writer might be attributed the foreknowledge that unanticipated 
cases would arise, as well as the intent that the rule nonetheless be followed in all such cases, for 
the simple reason that rules should be respected.  It would then be difficult to say that any literal 
application of the rule would really be “unacceptable” to the rule writer, and thus that there could 
even be such a thing as a hard case.  This Article does not address that question.  “Unacceptable” 
here is meant in the limited sense that if the rule writer had been faced, ex ante, before writing the 
rule, with the question of whether she could accept a rule that produced the given result in this 
particular scenario, the answer would have been “no” (and therefore she would, if the issue had 
been brought to her attention, have written into the rule an exception for this fact pattern).  This 
Article simply contends that hard cases under this definition are always impossible for any rule 
writer to avoid. 
38. Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1687–88.  Another term that has been employed for this idea is 
“symbolic fixity.”  Gifford, supra note 28, at 417 (citing Paul J. Mishkin, ON LAW IN COURTS 84 
(1965)). 
39. One way to voice the criticism of Ronald Dworkin’s identification of a “principle” as 
something distinct from a “rule,” see Dworkin, supra note 28, is to observe that a principle is 
simply a rule that happens to be both general and non-formally realizable. 
40. Some writers define specificity differently.  Ehrlich and Posner, for example, define a law 
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or subjective—e.g., the two driving regulations contrasted just above—
as can a very specific rule—e.g., “Between 9:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m., 
when snow is on the ground, do not drive more than 35 mph,” versus 
“Between 9:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m., when snow is on the ground, drive 
extra carefully.”41 
Much of the historical scholarship is concerned with the objective-
subjective axis, and involves the idea that if rules are not objectively 
realizable, then decisions will effectively be delegated to the judge or 
other decision maker and will therefore inevitably be affected or even 
determined by that particular decision maker’s value system and 
prejudices.42  Discussions of formal realizability raise issues like whom 
we want making a particular decision—the legislature or a judge43—
and questions such as Kennedy’s battle between the values of 
“communitarianism” and “individualism.”  Kennedy associates 
delegation of authority to a judge, by means of a standard, with the 
value of community.  Conversely, Kennedy associates specificity with 
the value of individualism.  He therefore takes the view that the choice 
between rules and standards is not so much a question of efficacious 
 
as being more “precise” (the opposite of general), when fewer and simpler facts attach to definite 
legal consequences, which seems an odd definition.  Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 27, at 261. 
41. See Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1689 (noting that generality is different from formal 
realizability).  Not all the commentators—e.g., Judge Posner—do a good job keeping these two 
dimensions separate.  See POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 27, at 48.  
Generality and subjectivity, while distinct dimensions, are not entirely orthogonal, as Kennedy 
also understood.  At the “generality end” the two merge: It is not possible to imagine a 
reasonable, perfectly general rule that is not also at least partly subjective, along the lines of, 
“[W]here the rule system is otherwise silent, the governing rule is ‘Do not be evil.’”  See 
Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1700 (explaining the practical impossibility of “maintaining a highly 
formal regime” with the application of rules). 
42. This is the principal burden of the Realists’ argument. 
43. With a specific rule, the idea is that it is the legislature that will have decided the case, ex 
ante; with a standard, it is the judge, ex post.  Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An 
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559–62 (1992).  In fact, the distinction between a “rule” 
and a “standard” has been defined by reference to whether the decision as to a particular case is to 
be made before or after the fact.  Id. at 559.  Schauer calls this “decisional jurisdiction.”  See 
Schauer, Formalism, supra note 20, at 539 (explaining that the value of rules, as opposed to 
standards, is “disabling certain classes of decisionmakers from making certain kinds of 
decisions”).  In certain contexts, like criminal law, this ex ante versus ex post distinction has 
constitutional due process implications.  Kaplow, supra, at 608. See also Robert C. Post, 
Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 CAL. L. REV. 491, 491–98 
(1994) (discussing the Supreme Court’s application of the “void for vagueness” doctrine).  In 
general, if the stakes involved with violating a rule are higher—as is true in criminal law and 
sometimes in tax law—the argument for precision is stronger, because it allows for advance 
decision making to avoid violating the rule.  Surrey, supra note 35, at 682, 698.  See also Ehrlich 
& Posner, supra note 27, at 261 (describing the factors that weigh for and against the application 
of rules or standards). 
2_STUMPFF 3/9/2013  1:32 PM 
664 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  44 
rule drafting as one of morality.44 
The present discussion differs from most of the legal philosophical 
thread by focusing on the general-specific dimension rather than the 
objective-subjective dimension.  For example, as noted in Part III, a 
question that has occupied writers is whether rules ever actually 
constrain decision makers.  At its philosophical extension, this inquiry 
is a special case of the question of whether language itself can ever have 
fixed meaning.45  For present purposes, I simply assume that there can 
exist such a thing as an objective rule that can constrain decision 
makers.  I make this assumption mostly because if there is not such a 
thing, then my contention is already proved: having an exhaustive set of 
perfectly specific rules is in that case already obviously pointless, with 
no further need for discussion about the feasibility or merits of 
specificity.  Specificity is meaningful only if determinateness is 
possible.46 
Aside from that, in the real world just about everyone believes in the 
possibility of objectivity.  Outside the walls of law schools, no one for 
practical purposes takes seriously or even knows about the Realist thesis 
that all rules are or might be indeterminate.  Legislators, judges, 
lawyers, and the public alike assume it is at least possible to write words 
that can have constraining effect.47  My  limited point, then, is that even 
if we grant for argument’s sake the accuracy of this perception under 
which the world labors—that law can at least sometimes be 
determinate—it remains provable that law cannot always be 
determinate, or at least cannot always be both determinate and 
appropriate. 
One writer who did think about the specific-general continuum was 
Bayless Manning, most famous for having coined the term “hyperlexis.”  
 
44. Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1712–13.  As described below in note 62 infra and 
accompanying text, Justice Scalia associates very different values with the identical distinction. 
45. For more on the issue of indefiniteness in language, see Gifford, supra note 27, at 423–24; 
Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 29, at 416–20; Miller, supra note 32, at 34; Jeremy Waldron, 
Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CAL. L. REV. 509 (1994); 
Schauer, Open Texture, supra note 31.  For a summary of the long philosophical debate about 
rules’ determinacy, see Miller, supra note 32, at 2, 76 n.346.   
46. Professor Miller makes the similar point that the “vast proliferation of rules in the law of 
federal taxation rests upon the belief that elaborate rules can render tax law both fair and certain.  
The unspoken assumptions are that rules determine outcomes in a mechanical fashion and that 
fairness can be provided by such a process.”  Miller, supra note 32, at 3.  Miller offers a 
penetrating and lengthy analysis of the determinacy issue in the context of tax law, ultimately 
concluding that tax law is “generally determinate.”  Id. at 28, 62. 
47. For example, for a “tax professional, the thought that tax law I pervasively indeterminate 
may seem as utterly alien point of view.”  Id. at 29. 
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By that word Manning meant “the pathological condition caused by an 
overactive lawmaking gland”—the explosion in the sheer volume of 
American law.48  Though hyperlexis is itself relevant to the present 
discussion, another less famous idea that Manning introduced later—the 
“Conservation of Ambiguity”—is much more so.49 
In his earlier “Hyperlexis” article, Manning wrote: 
A significant part of the hyperlexis problem arises from the effort to 
deal with problems with too great particularity.  Contrary to surface 
impression, detailed specificity in a legal provision does not reduce 
disputes; particularization merely changes the vocabulary of the 
dispute.  The most detailed statutes, like the Internal Revenue Code, 
are the ones that proliferate most rapidly and generate both the 
greatest need for administration and the most disputes.50 
Returning to the same point in a later article, Manning proposed a 
“Law of Conservation of Ambiguity”: 
 Elaboration in drafting does not result in reduced ambiguity.  Each 
elaboration introduced to meet one problem of interpretation imports 
with it new problems of interpretation.  Replacing one bundle of legal 
words with another bundle of legal words does not extinguish debate, 
it only shifts the terms in which the debate is conducted.  In physics, 
we are all familiar with the Law of Conservation of Energy; in law, 
there is an analogous Law of Conservation of Ambiguity.  
.  .  .  . 
. . . [The] Law of Conservation of Ambiguity tells us that the 
draftsman can control and select what will be left ambiguous, but he 
cannot banish or control the aggregate amount of ambiguity.51 
 
48. Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 767, 767 (1977) 
[hereinafter Manning, Our National Disease]. 
49. Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis and the Law of Conservation of Ambiguity: Thoughts on 
Section 385, 36 TAX LAW. 9, 11 (1982) [hereinafter Manning, Conservation of Ambiguity].  This 
article was occasioned by the U.S. Treasury Department’s release in 1982 of “110 single-spaced 
pages” of regulations defining the difference between corporate “debt” and corporate “equity.”  
Id. at 9.  The Conservation of Ambiguity paper is infrequently cited; it has had nothing near the 
impact of Manning’s original Hyperlexis article. 
50. Manning, Our National Disease, supra note 48, at 773.  John Miller recognized the same 
idea.  See infra note 67 and accompanying text.  To similar effect, see also James W. Colliton, 
Standards, Rules, and the Decline of the Courts in the Law of Taxation, 99 DICK. L. REV. 265, 
312 (1995). 
51. Manning, Conservation of Ambiguity, supra note 49, at 11.  By way of illustration, 
Manning compared the two extremes of rule style: 
Consider the United States Constitution.  The Constitution is open-ended, 
generalized and telescopic in character.  What has it spawned?  Pervasive ambiguity 
and unending litigation. 
Contrast the extreme counter-model of law, the Internal Revenue Code and its 
festooned vines of regulations.  The Code and regulations are particularized, elaborated 
 
2_STUMPFF 3/9/2013  1:32 PM 
666 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  44 
Even more than “open texture,” the idea of “conservation of ambiguity” 
at a rule’s margins captures perfectly the idea of a fractal.52 
Of course the arguments in favor of precision are many, including 
that precise rules prevent disputes,53 enable people to plan,54 provide 
stability,55 and satisfy a deep human need for certainty and closure.56  
Perhaps the weightiest justification, however, is that, as noted above, 
precise rules leave the decision regarding covered cases with the 
rulemaker—the legislature—and avoid having to shift rulemaking 
 
and microscopic in character.  What have they spawned?  Pervasive ambiguity and 
unending litigation. 
Id. at 12. 
52. As imagery, Manning happened to choose one of the examples Benoit Mandelbrot had 
already identified as a naturally occurring fractal:  
Depending upon the lens and distance chosen by the photographer, a camera aimed 
in the same direction can focus on a forest, or a tree, or a branch, or a leaf, or the cells 
in the leaf.  Though each snapshot, in a sense, depicts the same thing, each snapshot is 
different.  Each successive magnification clarifies some feature of the object 
photographed.  But each magnification also reveals new interior complexities that had 
not been visible before.  And in all the photos, the lines of definition will be blurred; 
the lines in the microscopic shot will be as ambiguous at the margin as those in the 
telescopic shot. 
Id. at 11.  See MANDELBROT, supra note 13, at 156–65 (identifying the borders of trees as 
examples of fractal shapes). 
53. See Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 29, at 404 (“[P]recise language forestalls litigation 
with respect even to matters of great moment, while relatively vague language encourages 
litigation, even as to matters that are completely trivial.”). 
54. See Holmes, supra note 24, at 457 (“The object of our study, then, is prediction.”); Miller, 
supra note 32, at 21–22 (explaining that the tax planner is less vulnerable to a “substance over 
form” argument by the government where the Internal Revenue Code is precise).  The 
predictability of outcomes permitted by precision has been promoted on economic and efficiency 
grounds.  See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 27, at 264–67 (explaining the benefits of precise legal 
rules in terms of their subsequent effects on behavior in the legal system).  All these contentions, 
as well as Schauer’s, miss—or at least fail to address—Manning’s point illustrated above.  See 
supra note 52.  The presumed attractiveness of infinite precision may have been stated most 
extravagantly by law and economics theorists Isaac Ehrlich and Judge Richard Posner: “A 
perfectly detailed and comprehensive set of rules brings society nearer to its desired allocation of 
resources by discouraging socially undesirable activities and encouraging socially desirable 
ones.”  Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 27, at 262 (emphasis added). 
55.  See Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1688 (“Two great social virtues of rules: restraint of 
official arbitrariness and certainty.”).  Schauer, Formalism, supra note 20, at 542 (“Thus, 
stability, not as a necessary condition for predictability but as a value in its own right, is fostered 
by truncating the decisionmaking authority.”).   
56. This need was characterized by Jerome Frank, a prominent Legal Realist, as “childish.”  
See generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, ch. 17 (1936).  This is perhaps an 
unfairly harsh assessment.  As Holmes (the only contemporary juristic example Frank could find 
of an “adult”) had noted, much really is at stake in predicting the application of a legal rule.  Id. at 
168.  See also Manning, Conservation of Ambiguity, supra note 49, at 10 (“Every expert, in every 
field of endeavor, when confronted by a problem, is seized by an urge to elaborate.”). 
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discretion to the judge.57  They thus promote the “rule of law.”58  
Justice Scalia holds up—as the reductio ad absurdum of the contrary, 
disfavored “delegation” approach—the example of King Louis IX of 
France, who reputedly decided all legal disputes by gathering his 
courtiers around him under the shade of an oak tree and personally 
choosing the particular outcomes he deemed most just.59 
At the same time, vagueness can have practical benefits.  As many 
have pointed out, a vague rule denies people the benefit of a clear line 
up to which they could otherwise toe.60  As one tax administrator put it, 
 
57. See Colliton, supra note 50, at 308–09 (1995) (summarizing the role of detailed tax law in 
retaining power with the legislature rather than courts); Surrey, supra note 35, at 698 (“[T]he 
answers provided by the detailed statute are legislative answers, and to many this is a factor of 
great importance.”).   
58. See 3 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 679 (1959) [hereinafter POUND, JURISPRUDENCE].  
As Pound put it:  
[T]he subject of codification is intimately connected with the idea of a written law.  It 
is a form of the demand for a complete, intelligible, authoritative statement of the 
precepts governing individual relations and individual conduct.  It is a phase of the 
demand that every man shall be assured of knowing what he may do and what he may 
not do.  It is related to the idea behind our Bills of Rights.  It is a part of the quest of a 
government of laws and not of men; it is part of the claim that men be assured that the 
magistrate shall regulate their conduct and adjust their relations according to pre-
established law and not in accordance with his more or less arbitrary will.  It has to do 
with an important aspect of the social interest in the general security in that it is one 
means of excluding the personal element in the administration of justice and thus of 
insuring uniformity, equality, and certainty.  Indeed, the idea of a written law is urged 
not only to assure these things, but in order to make the lay public believe that they are 
assured.  For if it is important that justice be done, it is no less important that people 
feel justice has been done.  The stability of the legal ordering of society depends quite 
as much upon the latter as upon the former.   
Id.  See also Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 27, at 259, 267 (observing that rules are better than 
standards, because rules are better at controlling officials). 
59. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1175–76 
(1989).  This is Plato’s “ideal despot,” but not ideal.  A famous statement about the extreme 
“standards” end of the rules-standards spectrum is Justice Cardozo’s concerning the requirement 
that a business expense be “ordinary” in order to be tax-deductible: “The standard set up by the 
statute is not a rule of law; it is rather a way of life.  Life in all its fullness must supply the answer 
to the riddle.”  Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). 
60. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Introduction to Void for Vagueness Symposium, 82 CAL. L. 
REV. 487, 489 (1994) (“A precise rule typically induces people to conform exactly to the legal 
standard in order to avoid liability.  Conversely, uncertainty may cause people to overcomply 
with the presumptive standard in order to allow for a margin of error in its application.”); Ross F. 
Cranston, Reform through Legislation: The Dimension of Legislative Technique, 73 NW. U. L. 
REV. 873, 884 (1979) (“If those to whom legislation is directed are uncertain as to whether an 
agency will invoke sanctions against a particular activity they may prefer to avoid the risk and 
desist from the activity.”); James S. Eustice, Tax Complexity and the Tax Practitioner, 45 TAX L. 
REV. 7, 23 (1989) (“There may well be some virtue in vagueness particularly in the tax avoidance 
area, so as to restrain overzealous taxpayers, because if they know exactly where the lines are, 
they soon will be teetering on the very edge of those lines with depressing frequency.”); Gifford, 
 
2_STUMPFF 3/9/2013  1:32 PM 
668 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  44 
detailed rules “suffocate the many taxpayers who try to do what’s right, 
while providing a road map for the few with larceny in their hearts.”61 
The tendency toward overelaboration discussed in this Article is 
driven by people, like Justice Scalia, who do not prefer a subjective rule 
because it is unpredictable and therefore sure to be applied unequally.62  
However, an objective rule that is also general, such as “no vehicles in 
the park,” will simply be wrong for many situations.  “Do not drive 
more than 55 mph” is certainly not the correct rule for some stretches of 
road under some conditions—either too restrictive or too lenient.63  So 
we may prefer not just to say “do not drive over 55 mph,” because that 
is often the wrong (suboptimal and arbitrary, and therefore arguably 
“unfair”) rule;64 but we also do not want merely to say “drive safely,” 
because that approach leaves too much power in the hands of the judge 
and is, as a result, unpredictable and likely to be unevenly applied.65  
Writing many specific, objective rules tailored for different situations is 
a tempting means of addressing both problems at once; those who favor 
such an approach want it all—certainty and no “hard” cases.66  The 
 
supra note 27, at 435–37; Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness: An Economic 
Perspective on Precision in the Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 541, 546–53 (1994); Kennedy, supra note 
12, at 1695–96.  Legislative drafters may also be deliberately vague in order to obtain the 
necessary majority vote—but that is a different issue.  Here, we are assuming the rule writer can 
realize the optimal rule form, and are asking what that optimal rule form is.  See Colin S. Diver, 
The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 75 (1983). 
61. I.R.S. Commissioner Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., Memorandum to All Employees of the Chief 
Counsel, All Employees of the Office of Tax Counsel, All Employees of the Office of Tax 
Policy, and All Assistants to the Commissioner (May 1, 1992).  This point is further pursued infra 
notes 102–04. 
62. Scalia, supra note 59, at 1179.  Scalia is less in favor of the “discretion-conferring 
approach,” and more in favor of uniformity and precision, for reasons that are essentially the 
mirror-opposite of those Duncan Kennedy lists for coming out the other way.  See supra notes 
43–44 and accompanying text.  Scalia purports to argue that even a bad, objectively realizable 
rule is better than leaving everything to the judge’s discretion (“purports” because Scalia’s 
fidelity to this principle has been questioned).  See Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, 
supra note 6, at 22–23.  But Scalia is mostly concerned with court-made, not legislature-made, 
law, and thus more concerned with the objectively realizable-non-objectively realizable spectrum 
than the general-specific spectrum.  Scalia, supra note 59, at 1179–80. 
63. A comparable example is the age at which a person is deemed to have attained legal 
competence.  Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1689. 
64. Precision leads to arbitrariness and hence to hard cases.  See Miller, supra note 32, at 44–
46.  See also id. at 55, 56 (explaining how arbitrariness varies inversely with generality and 
fairness and certainty can be antithetical concepts). 
65. For a rulemaker to provide only a nondeterministic, subjective “standard,” like 
“reasonable man,” is to acknowledge the fractal’s existence but to leave it to judges to locate the 
fractal’s edge, as it were, on an as-needed basis. 
66. See Miller, supra note 32, at 9 (“Those who opt for what I call the elaboration approach 
toward tax rulemaking apparently believe they have discovered a safe passage between the devil 
of arbitrariness and the deep blue sea of indeterminacy.”); id. at 46 (“[T]he elaboration approach 
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point of this Article is that that approach has its own problems 
including, ultimately, futility, which commentators and especially rule 
writers have not sufficiently recognized.  The rule writer cannot have it 
all.67 
After two-and-a-half thousand years of discussion about the relative 
merits of rules and standards, a few things seem clear.  One is that the 
approach you prefer is in large degree a function of which values you 
prioritize.  Another is that certain relevant observations seem to have 
been made but then mostly ignored; or if not ignored, at least 
insufficiently emphasized.68  The first of these observations is that, as to 
the “rules” end of the rules-standards spectrum, there is no such end.69  
Provably, you can never have a specific rule for every situation.  (And if 
you did, the result would not deserve to be called a set of “rules”—by 
 
seeks to escape indeterminacy and unfairness through greater and greater specificity in the black 
letter law.”). 
67. See id. at 5 (“[T]he simultaneous effort to achieve both fairness and certainty through 
great elaboration of the rules of taxation is inherently contradictory and yields a never ending 
spiral of complexity.”).  Professor Schauer blames the excesses of Realists and others on the 
mistaken presumption, to which they overreacted, that certainty is possible.  Schauer, Easy Cases, 
supra note 29, at 423.  But Schauer also argues, interestingly, and in absolute contrast to Jerome 
Frank, that the popular myth of linguistic certainty—like the myth of Santa Claus—has a 
potentially beneficial effect.  Belief in the myth constrains; it serves as the “conscience on the 
judicial shoulder.”  Id. at 439–40.  But see Frank, supra note 56.  For roughly the same argument 
as Schauer’s articulated a century earlier, see POUND, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 58, at 673–79, 
732–38. 
68. A long list of writers have discussed the idea of infinite precision as though that might 
actually be one of the options available to a rule writer.  See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 60, at 489 
(“Finding the ideal legal standard can require more information than is available to the 
legislature,” rather than “will always be impossible for the legislature.” (emphasis added)); Diver, 
supra note 60, at 73 (noting that foreseeing every possibility “may be” (rather than “will be”) 
impossible); Kaplow, supra note 43, at 559, 590, 563 (explaining that a rule that would apply to 
every possible category would be “wasteful,” rather than the more accurate “impossible”) 
(emphasis added); Sunstein, supra note 27, at 957 (“[O]ften [not always] rulemakers cannot 
foresee the circumstances to which their rules will be applied.” (emphasis added)).  Stanley 
Surrey, who in addition to being a commentator was also one of the culpable rule writers, thought 
one solution to tax code complexity was just to transfer authority for detailed rulemaking to the 
U.S. Treasury Department—to let the bureaucracy be as precise as necessary.  Surrey, supra note 
35, at 703.  But the Treasury is as capable as Congress of drowning readers in detail and as 
incapable of foreseeing all potentially relevant scenarios.  On the other hand, for writers (in 
addition to Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Hart) who have recognized the impossibility of 
complete precision, see Miller, supra note 32, at 53–54 (“To fairly address [everything] . . . seems 
both hopeless and perhaps even ridiculous.”); Waldron, supra note 45, at 522–26. 
69. Neither the objective-subjective nor the detailed-general axis has an identifiable terminus 
at the objective or detailed end of the respective scale.  See discussion supra notes 39–46 and 
accompanying text.  One can imagine a definite bound on the other end—the subjective, general, 
“standards” side: “That which is just is legal; and that which is not just is illegal.”  But the 
opposite, detailed-objective ends of both spectra are infinite, which is what causes hard cases and 
ultimately what led to the rules-cynicism of Realists and others. 
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definition, a rule, as opposed to a decision, must apply to more than a 
single case.)70 
Meanwhile, lawmakers continue to write rules without much 
evidence of having considered any of the above.71  Much of current 
American statutory and regulatory law is characterized by what has 
been called the “elaboration” approach72—trying to enumerate as many 
foreseeable factual occurrences as possible and write a specific rule for 
each.  Along the way, the rule writers have begun unintentionally to 
illustrate the costs (legal, economic, and political) of trying to do the 
impossible.  Thus, the second insufficiently recognized point is that if 
you try too hard—if the rule writer is too detailed—the rules will 
become, literally, too lengthy to read.  Their mere existence will tend to 
impose untenable burdens upon the regulated population. 
V. COMPLEXITY AND ITS COSTS 
In 1913, the original U.S. Internal Revenue Code comprised 
approximately 12,000 words (materially shorter than the present 
Article) and was printed on twenty-seven, six-by-nine-inch pages.73  By 
1942, its length had reached 79,000 words.74  Now the Internal Revenue 
Code runs to more than 3.4 million words75—four times the length of 
the King James Bible—and 5000 pages.76  It now contains at least one 
sentence whose length alone exceeds 2800 words.77  Indeed, an entire 
 
70. SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 5, at 18.  See Schauer, The Generality of 
Law, supra note 32, at 229 (“[I]t is a defining feature of rules that they collect numerous 
relevantly different events and treat them the same way.”). 
71. Ehrlich and Posner have proposed, not very persuasively in the author’s experience, that 
the expected economic implications of vagueness and specificity do explain how rules have been 
written in the real world.  Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 27, at 272–75. 
72. See Miller, supra note 32, at 9.  
73. See When It Comes to Tax Law, It’s Complicated, CCH INC., http://www.cch.com/ 
wbot2012/020TaxCode.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2012) (providing calculations).  To determine 
the upper word count bound, the author loaded the text of the Revenue Act of 1913 into a 
computer word processing program and ran the program’s word-count utility. 
74. Calculated in the same manner as the 1913 Act, described supra note 73. 
75. See John Walker, U.S. Tax Code On-Line, http://www.fourmilab.ch/uscode/26usc/ (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2012).  
76. CCH, a leading tax publisher, maintains a web site with these statistics and other 
information about the explosive growth in tax law volume.  See When It Comes to Tax Law, 
supra note 73.  These figures of course do not count other forms of guidance, beginning with 
regulations, which according to Professor Miller themselves now occupy approximately 10,000 
pages.  Miller, supra note 32, at 8.   
77. 26 U.S.C. § 4975(d) (2006).  This provision was identified by quick manual review of the 
employee benefits-related tax provisions.  The Code surely contains even longer sentences.  Until 
its repeal, section 341(e) famously featured a sentence with over 400 words before the reader 
reached the sentence’s verb.  See 26 U.S.C. § 341(e) (repealed 2003); Boris Bittker, Tax Reform 
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genre of legal scholarship has sprung up just around the complexity of 
the federal income tax code.78 
Still, not even tax law seems to have quite the same reputation for 
complexity as that which the author’s own specialty, employee benefits 
law, has acquired during the relatively brief period of its existence.79  In 
the words of one tax authority, benefits law is “[e]ven more unknowable 
 
and Tax Simplification, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 1 (1974); Jerry Boyle, Debris: What Lawyers 
Can Learn from Poets, POETRY FOUND. (2011), http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poetry 
magazine/article/242688).  For comparison, the entire Gettysburg Address comprised 272 words.  
President Abraham Lincoln, Address at the Dedication of the National Cemetery at Gettysburg, 
Pennsylvania (Nov. 19, 1863), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php? 
pid=73959&st.  
78. See Miller, supra note 32, at 5–9 (taking as a “point of departure” that tax law is 
characterized by “extremely burdensome complexity”); id. at 8 n.28 (providing a summary of 
scholarship on tax simplicity).  As Jimmy Carter remarked, “[O]ur income tax system . . . is a 
disgrace to the human race.”  U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Address Accepting the Presidential 
Nomination at the Democratic National Convention in New York City: Our Nation’s Past and 
Future (July 15, 1976), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25953.  
This all goes at least as far back as the somewhat overused quote from Judge Learned Hand (that 
I will nonetheless use again here): 
[T]he words of such an act as the Income Tax, for example, merely dance before my 
eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference to cross-reference, exception upon 
exception—couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold of—leave in 
my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but successfully concealed, 
purport, which it is my duty to extract, but which is within my power, if at all, only 
after the most inordinate expenditure of time.  I know that these monsters are the result 
of fabulous industry and ingenuity, plugging up this hole and casting out that net, 
against all possible evasion; yet at times I cannot help recalling a saying of William 
James about certain passages of Hegel: that they were no doubt written with a passion 
of rationality; but that one cannot help wondering whether to the reader they have any 
significance save that the words are strung together with syntactical correctness. 
Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947).  As James Eustice observed 
in 1989, Judge Hand wrote the foregoing passage about the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, which 
was “almost childlike in its simplicity” compared to that in effect in 1989.  Eustice, supra note 
60, at 7.  Now we are able to say that the Code of 1989 was an adolescent compared to that of 
2012.  Stanley Surrey aptly restated Hand’s description of the problem for a reader: “The 
consequences of this detailed drafting style are thus very often precision of detail but obscurity of 
over-all policy and intent.  We see the trees and not the forest—indeed we often see trees, bushes, 
shrubs, and even tall grass and must work hard to distinguish among them.”  Surrey, supra note 
35, at 699 (emphasis added). 
79. It seems worthwhile here to acknowledge expressly that “employee benefits law” has 
emerged during the last two generations as an identifiable American legal subspecialty.  
Specialists in this field first appeared in law firms and can now also be found among the legal 
academy, a trend that accelerated with the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974, or “ERISA.”  As with tax law, the complaint about pension law being too complex 
is old.  Seventy years ago, a commentator wrote that the federal pension laws included 
“provisions so complicated that they are difficult to read.”  David A. Pratt, Pension 
Simplification, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 565, 565 (2002) (quoting John W. Drye, Jr., Pension and 
Other Deferred Compensation Plans under Section 162 of the Revenue Act of 1942, 2 N.Y.U. 
INST. FED. TAX’N 48, 50 (1943)). 
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than anything that has come before.”80  Adjectives like “confusing,” 
“incoherent,” and “incomprehensible” characterize descriptions of this 
field.81  Regulators, law students, practicing lawyers—even judges—
routinely express outrage about the complexity of American employee 
benefits law.  A relatively young sitting U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
recently retired from the bench, seeming to cite the chore of deciding 
employee benefits cases as one of his reasons for departing.82 
But why is this?  What, exactly, is the matter with employee benefits 
law?  The most commonly offered answer is that the field is 
“complex.”83  It is not, though, that the subject is complex in the sense 
of being difficult to understand, in the way that quantum mechanics is 
considered to be complex.84  Rather, employee benefits law is complex 
in the way a network of pipes is complex; or a maze; or the 
organizational chart of the Internal Revenue Service; or the circuitry on 
a computer chip.  These things are complex in the sense the word is 
used in the phrase “a complex web.”  To contemplate a large oil refinery 
is to be overwhelmed by the number of the pipes and their endless and 
obscure interconnections.  It can be hard to fathom that each part of the 
network—every one of the thousands of individual joints, valves, and 
loops—can have been deliberately fitted into place according to a 
coherent scheme, or that anyone could now hope to trace or predict the 
 
80. Eustice, supra note 60, at 9. 
81. Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed Care, and How to Fix It: 
Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REV. 457, 460–61 (2003) (“confusing”); 
Brendan S. Maher, The Benefits of Opt-In Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1733, 1756 n.120 (2011) 
(“incoherent”); Billee Elliott McAuliffe, The Changing World of HMO Liability under ERISA, 22 
J. LEG. MED. 77, 79 (2001) (“incomprehensible”). 
82. See Jess Bravin & Greg Hitt, Justice Souter to Retire from Court, WALL ST. J., May 1, 
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124114676548376235.html (“Justice Souter has 
complained about life in Washington and even about aspects of the court’s work, such as the 
numbingly technical cases involving applications of pension or benefits law.”).  I am indebted to 
Professor Brendan Maher for bringing this item to my attention.  It is clear that an area of law is 
problematic if the prospect of having to think about it once or twice a year (the Court generally 
decides no more than two employee benefits cases per term) is too high a price to pay to serve on 
the U.S. Supreme Court. 
83. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1469 (1995); 
McAuliffe, supra note 81, at 79; Stephen E. Ehlers & David R. Wise, So What’s ERISA All 
About? A Concise Guide for Labor and Employment Attorneys, 77 N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 22, 22 
(2005); Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition Insights into Judicial Decisionmaking in Employee 
Benefits Cases: Lessons From Conkright v. Frommert, 3 AM. U. L. & EMP’T L. FORUM 
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 3), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2139205&download=yes. 
84. It is true that some math is involved in practicing both employee benefits and tax law.  But 
the level of difficulty seldom rises to that of middle school algebra.  Calculational difficulty is 
simply not a significant part of the explanation for either field’s reputation for complexity. 
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flow of fluid from one distant place to another.  The complexity of a 
refinery is, ultimately, a function of the sheer numbers of pipes and their 
connections with each other.85  This complexity is an emergent “group 
property” of a number of elements, each one itself simple, in the same 
way a black-and-white image is an emergent group property of some 
quantity and arrangement of black or white dots and not the property of 
any one dot. 
It would appear this description applies also to tax law and employee 
benefits law.86  The complexity of these subjects has, in the end, to do 
with the number of rules and ways they relate to each other—e.g., the 
cross-references, the defined terms.  Maze-like complexity—
“elaborative complexity,”87 it has been called, to distinguish it from 
other types of complexity—might be defined as “inaccessibility due to 
volume.”  Such complexity is borne, at least in part, of the attempt to be 
specific about every possible fact situation.88 
 
85. The cumulative quantification of elements corresponds to mathematical definitions of 
“complexity” that have been proposed for “networks” (such as pipes or circuits).  See Danail 
Bonchev & Gregory A. Buck, Quantitative Measures of Network Complexity, in COMPLEXITY IN 
CHEMISTRY, BIOLOGY, AND ECOLOGY 191 (Paul G. Mezey et al. eds., 2005); D Minoli, 
Combinatorial Graph Complexity, in ATTI. ACAD. NAZ. LINCEI REND. 59, 651–61 (1976).  Like 
many seemingly fundamental ideas, legal “complexity” has no universally accepted meaning.  It 
has been defined by some commentators to include the idea of “judgmental complexity,” which is 
the inability to predict how courts will rule on a question.  Miller, supra note 32, at 12–13.  See 
also Bittker, supra note 77, at 2; Surrey, supra note 35, at 693.  This meaning does not fit 
particularly well, in the author’s opinion, with the ordinary usage of the term “complexity.”  
Another writer defines the complexity of a rule with reference to the cost of accessing it, which 
seems to come closer to the intuitive meaning, albeit indirectly.  See infra note 100.   
86. See Colliton, supra note 50, at 283 (“[C]ongress simply tried to clear up troublesome little 
problems.  The solutions Congress enacted were invariably rational.  These statutory solutions are 
only troublesome when viewed as part of the current massive and intricate Internal Revenue 
Code.”). 
87. The term is Professor Miller’s.  Miller, supra note 32, at 12.  The idea might also be called 
“reticulation complexity,” which is to say “net-like complexity,” as suggested by the Supreme 
Court’s much-cited characterization of ERISA as “a comprehensive and reticulated statute.”  
Nachman Corp. v. PBGC, 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980). 
88. Other causes can also be identified.  For example, the necessity of legislative compromise 
may lead to complexity.  Surrey, supra note 35, at 690.  Mark Schwimmer, a former senior 
Internal Revenue Service Chief Counsel official who was involved in the drafting of many U.S. 
Treasury regulations, observes that arguably over-complex rules also sometimes result from the 
urge to prevent someone from receiving an unjust windfall.  Schwimmer points out that these 
rules often cost everyone else more in the aggregate than the amount of the windfall prevented.  
Although this latter cost is often overlooked, the urge is so powerful and the politics so appealing 
that Schwimmer suspects many would support such rules even if they understood the cost.  
Telephone Interview with Mark Schwimmer, Former Senior IRS Chief Counsel Official (Nov. 
30, 2012).  Space does not, regrettably, permit further exploration of this idea here, other than to 
suggest that Internal Revenue Code section 409A is one arguable example, at least in part, of the 
phenomenon Schwimmer has identified.  Andrew W. Stumpff, Deferred Compensation and the 
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 For instance, the following passage can be found among the 
regulations promulgated by the U.S. Department of Treasury, 
interpreting the rules that apply to “qualified” retirement plans under 
section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (it is one among a very 
large number of provisions that could have been chosen to illustrate the 
point): “Q: When does an employee attain age 70 ½?  A: An employee 
attains age 70 ½ as of the date six calendar months after the 70th 
anniversary of the employee’s birth.”89 
It was not actually insane for the Treasury Department to include this 
pronouncement among its formal published regulations.  The rule writer 
was trying to leave nothing to chance, since the idea of “½” as an age is 
susceptible to more than one possible meaning.  For example, “age 70 
½” could conceivably be interpreted to mean 70 years plus 182 ½ 
days.90  But a regulation like this does invite the reader to consider a 
couple of issues.  First, if we really mean to construct a complete rule 
system in which every instance that rises to this level of potential 
ambiguity is to be specifically identified and eradicated in advance, 
think of the number of rules that would be required.  Second, observe 
that even this regulation does not eliminate all potential debate about 
when exactly a particular person may be said to have reached age 70 ½.  
What if the employee travels, for example, across the International Date 
Line?  Does she attain the requisite age on the appropriate date as 
measured in the place of her birth, or that of her new location?91 
The human yearning for advance certainty seems to have been felt 
even more keenly than elsewhere in fields like tax and employee 
benefits law.92  All lawyers’ desire for advance precision is 
understandable, given the nature of their work.  As Justice Holmes 
observed: 
The reason why [law] is a profession, why people will pay lawyers to 
argue for them or to advise them, is that in societies like ours the 
command of the public force is intrusted to the judges in certain cases, 
 
Tax Policy Limitations of the Nuclear Option, 117 TAX NOTES 611 (2007).  
89. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-2, Q&A-3, 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)(9)-2 (2012).  The rule is part of 
a set of regulations interpreting the Code’s requirement that distributions from a qualified plan 
must commence no later than an employee’s attainment of age 70 ½.  See also Michael Doran, 
Time to Start Over on Deferred Compensation, 28 VA. TAX REV. 223, 227–33 (2008) (providing 
an extended exegesis of comparable regulatory examples). 
90. Except, of course, for leap years, when it would have to mean 70 years plus 183 days. 
91. Professor Schauer is surely right that the ability to keep coming up with “weird cases” like 
this does not qualify as proof of the blanket claim that language is indeterminate.  See supra note 
34 and accompanying text.  But it seems to qualify as proof that no appropriate and objective rule 
could ever eliminate all possible weird cases. 
92. Surrey, supra note 35, at 697. 
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and the whole power of the state will be put forth, if necessary, to 
carry out their judgments and decrees.  People want to know under 
what circumstances and how far they will run the risk of coming 
against what is so much stronger than themselves, and hence it 
becomes a business to find out when this danger is to be feared.  The 
object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence 
of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts.93 
This point is the more compelling one in a field like income tax law, 
where no particular moral or social stigma attaches to paying no more 
than the smallest amount the law requires,94 and where the economic 
quantities at stake can mean clients are anxious to go just exactly as far 
as they are able without triggering a penalty. 
But despite a lawyer’s hopes, the rule writer cannot provide every 
answer in advance.  That a regulation may fail to address all the 
questions practitioners might have is neither a flaw in the regulation, 
nor a mistake by the regulation writer.  It is a feature of reality—part of 
the fabric of the universe. 
And what may not be obvious—because, again, the problem is 
emergent: each newly added rule may well itself be simple, so that the 
rule writer may not even be aware of the group property of complexity 
he or she is helping to make worse—is the full cost of trying to satisfy 
this unsatisfiable need for certainty.95  In attempting to be exhaustive, 
the rule writer creates complexity, the cost of which at some point 
 
93. Holmes, supra note 24, at 457.  The emphasis on prediction is, as Holmes asserted, what 
differentiates law from ethics or morality. 
94. Quite the opposite, actually.  As Governor Mitt Romney, the 2012 Republican presidential 
nominee said, “I pay all the taxes that are legally required and not a dollar more.  I don’t think 
you want someone as the candidate for president who pays more taxes than he owes.”  Lori 
Montgomery et al., Mitt Romney’s Tax Returns Shed Some Light on His Investment Wealth, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mitt-romney-releases-tax 
returns/2012/01/23/gIQAj5bUMQ_story.html. When it comes to taxes, more or less everyone 
involved can be taken to be Holmes’ “bad man”:  
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who 
cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, 
not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside 
of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience. 
Holmes, supra note 24, at 459. 
95. See Manning, Conservation of Ambiguity, supra note 49, at 14 (“We do not adequately 
weigh the social cost of ungoverned proliferation of the law.”); Colliton, supra note 50, at 283.  
This is an instance of the “tragedy of the commons,” where the commons could be thought of as 
representing the abstract societal value of accessible laws; and a single sheep grazing on the 
commons as a person’s obtaining an advance answer to a specific question through promulgation 
of a detailed rule.  See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 
(1968).  As Professor Bittker observed, “[S]implicity is like a lighthouse: everyone can attest to 
its value, but no one will pay the price voluntarily.”  Bittker, supra note 77, at 11. 
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outweighs the benefits of precision.96  It has been estimated, for 
example, that the annual economic cost of “tax compliance” in the U.S. 
is $431 billion, and that “the tax compliance industry” employs more 
people than Wal-Mart, UPS, McDonald’s, IBM, and Citigroup 
combined.97 
The degree to which these costs have been ignored or misjudged by 
legal writers, such as law and economics scholars purporting to 
calculate the optimal level of rule precision, is striking.  The usual 
operating assumption seems to have been that because uncertainty is 
costly, the existence of a rule for every situation will always reduce 
transaction costs.98  Surely the most extreme manifestation of this 
assumption is the assertion, by two of the most celebrated law and 
economics scholars, that so long as the cost of rulemaking is assumed to 
be zero, the economically optimum number of rules is infinite.99  That 
 
96. It is probably worth making clear at this point that in arguing against unrestrained detail, I 
do not mean to argue for unrestrained generality.  A tax code consisting only of the single 
provision, “Everyone must pay a fair amount,” would not be a good idea.  But there is no 
evidence that rule writers are in fact adopting that approach, perhaps because its disadvantages 
are more immediately obvious than the disadvantages associated with excessive precision; and so 
the objective here is just to point out those latter.  For any given situation, the appropriate level of 
generality must surely represent some happy medium between over-generality and over-precision.  
See Cranston, supra note 60, at 878 (“A point of diminishing returns can be reached, where to 
increase control in legal terms is counterproductive because of the consequential increase in 
complexity.”).  I merely observe that that happy medium will not be located by a rule writer who 
is in exclusive pursuit of precision.  See also infra note 115. 
97. See Arthur B. Laffer, The 30-Cent Tax Premium, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704116404576262761032853554.html 
(estimating that reducing the cost of tax compliance by half would raise gross domestic product in 
the United States by half a percentage point).  Isolating the part of this cost that is due to 
“elaborative complexity” would be difficult or impossible.  Although specific numbers might be 
speculative, however, the massive order of magnitude of the problem is not, as might be 
confirmed just by contemplating the time spent on one’s own tax return—or, for lawyers, in 
researching a particular client’s question—and multiplying that time and associated expense by at 
least several hundred million. 
98. One writer even speculates that vague standards rather than rules are more in the economic 
interests of lawyers, because vague rules deprive potential clients of any easy alternative means of 
gaining advance knowledge of likely outcomes.  Kaplow, supra note 43, at 620.  The tax and 
employee benefits experience would suggest the opposite is true, at least beyond a certain level of 
detail.  Quite a few tax and employee benefit lawyers have demonstrated that a very nice living 
can be wrung from acquiring sellable expertise about an impenetrable thicket of precise rules.  
See Surrey, supra note 35, at 699. 
99. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 27, at 265.  To similar effect is Surrey: “[I]t appears that the 
larger the amount of sensible detail that is accumulated and properly organized, the more 
effective the system will be in view of its ability to provide definite answers with rapidity.”  
Surrey, supra note 35, at 702.  For other examples of writers who have disregarded or failed to 
see the potential cost of perfect precision, see Gifford, supra note 27, at 415 (“It is easy to 
concede the practical inability of a legislator to foresee all of the situations to which a given law 
might be applicable; it is not so easy to discern, if a legislator were able to foresee all of those 
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this assertion is a fallacy is reasonably immediately clear.  If the number 
of rules were infinite, then so would be the cost in any specific case of 
accessing the applicable one.100 
Beyond accessibility, a cost of the “elaborative” approach is a 
lessened deterrent effect, as anticipated by many writers and described 
in Part IV.101  Both tax and employee benefits law offer ample 
illustration of how precision can be a bad thing, from the standpoint of 
influencing conduct, by reducing deterrence value.102  For example, the 
U.S. Treasury’s replacement of the previous brief (but vague) 
requirement that tax-qualified retirement plans “not discriminate in 
favor of highly compensated employees” with over one hundred pages 
of detailed nondiscrimination regulations103 answered a number of 
specific questions that had formerly been left to judges.  At the same 
time, however, the regulations made clear that employers are free to 
design plans that specifically do so discriminate, up to a precisely drawn 
point that no one had imagined permissible under the old, ambiguous 
rule.104 
Aggressive employers and taxpayers arguably do not deserve the 
certainty of knowing the precise location of a rule’s borders.  If the 
broad ranges of permissible and impermissible behaviors are apparent, 
it may be a good thing that the exact border between them is not visible.  
In any case, once a new level of detail has been provided by the 
government—a higher level of magnification of the fractal border 
resolved, as it were—practitioners and taxpayers immediately set to 
 
situations, why he should not spell them out in his law.”); Cranston, supra note 60, at 884 (“[T]he 
more precise the legislation, generally the more effective it is likely to be.”). 
100. The cost of indexing the rules would be infinite; the cost of searching them would be 
infinite.  Stating those two things differently, the cost would be infinitely great of ever ruling out 
the possibility in any given situation that there existed some more directly applicable rule, or one 
with higher precedence, than any rule already found.  (This tends in fact to be the time-consuming 
step when trying to answer a question under an enormous, though finite, law like the Internal 
Revenue Code.)  Complexity has in other hands been indeed defined by reference to accessibility 
costs.  Professor Eustice, for example, proposed as a definition of a “simple” law, one that is 
“knowable by the [regulators] and [regulated], at a reasonable cost.”  Eustice, supra note 60, at 
10. 
101. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
102. Surrey, supra note 35, at 700. 
103. 55 Fed. Reg. 19897 (1990).  For background, see generally Bruce Wolk, 
Nondiscrimination in Contributions and Benefits: The New Regulations, 25 GA. L. REV. 71 
(1990). 
104. See Peter R. Orszag & Norman P. Stein, Cross-Tested Defined Contribution Plans: A 
Response to Professor Zelinsky, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 629 (2001).  See also Colliton, supra note 50, 
at 288 (providing a comparable example of rule elaboration’s having enabled more aggressive 
taxpayer behavior). 
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work exploiting the new ambiguities brought to the foreground.  Thus 
develops a vicious cycle, whereby detailed rules enable “planning 
devices” that lead to the need for even more detailed rules, etc.105 
The coup de gràce may be the potential cost of the elaborative rule 
style for substantive policy choices.  Not only does excessive detail lead 
to an explosion in accessibility costs; not only does it encourage 
aggressive planning: the style also likely helps render certain policy 
decisions unpopular that might not otherwise be so.  This effect occurs 
because, although rule style is not inherently political or ideological, it 
often, in contemporary life, appears to be confused or associated with 
policy or ideology.  In particular, excessively lengthy rules are 
frequently associated with government intrusion and employed as an 
argument against regulation itself.106  But this association need not 
follow.  Strict regulation is not ineluctably the same as detailed 
regulation; strong management is not the same as micromanagement.  
The principle of rule accessibility is universal.107 
Considering all the costs, what is finally remarkable is the outright, 
utter futility of over-precision.  The length of the tax code has 
mushroomed and the number and volume of regulations specifically 
interpreting it have exploded; but specificity has not reduced the 
 
105. Colliton, supra note 50, at 288.  See Bittker, supra note 77, at 11 (“Much [statutory 
complexity] results from the tax expert’s analytic skill in sniffing out the potential abuses and 
potential inequities that can be generated by general rules, coupled with a utopian passion for 
eradicating both flaws.  These talents are possessed in equal measure by lawyers in the Treasury, 
on [the congressional staff], in the practicing bar and in the academic world . . . .  [H]owever 
divergent their motives and objectives, their common passion is a rule for every conceivable set 
of circumstances.”).  Bittker readily acknowledged that he himself had been a part of this 
problem.  Id. 
106. For one example, consider the “Contract from America,” the informal platform of the 
current conservative “Tea Party” movement of the Republican Party, which was “signed” by a 
number of candidates for political office in 2012.  The Contract from America, CONTRACT FROM 
AMERICA, http://www.thecontract.org/the-contract-from-america/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2012).  
The Contract contains two different agenda items relating to tax.  The first is Item 4, “Enact 
Fundamental Tax Reform,” which calls upon Congress to “[a]dopt a simple and fair single-rate 
tax system by scrapping the internal revenue code and replacing it with one that is no longer than 
4,543 words—the length of the original Constitution.”  Id.  The second is Item 10, “Stop the Tax 
Hikes,” which calls for “[p]ermanently repeal[ing] all tax hikes, including those to the income, 
capital gains, and death taxes, currently scheduled to begin in 2011.”  Id.  Item 10 is ideological, 
but Item 4 should not be so considered.  One could easily be in favor of a massive “death tax 
hike” and at the same time prefer that tax hike to be codified in an accessible way, which would 
suggest using the fewest number of words possible.  (No judgment is here expressed as to 
whether the proposed 4543 original-Constitution-word-limit metric makes any sense.) 
107. It has also been argued that statutory complexity plays a role in causing or enabling 
judges to decide cases based on their own “cultural motivation.”  See Secunda, supra note 83, at 
23.  If this is right, the judicial “cultural illiberalism” described by Professor Secunda can be 
counted as yet a further societal cost of elaborative complexity.  
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number of tax disputes.108  The search for certainty, like the search for 
the edge of a rainbow or for the border of a fractal, can, provably, never 
end.  The objective will continually recede.  Ambiguity is conserved.109 
CONCLUSION 
Even more so than other modern legal fields, American tax and 
employee benefits laws seem to have been written by people who were 
under the impression both that they could, and that they should, write a 
rule for every possible fact situation, and this has given rise to seriously 
unfortunate consequences.  If theory did not do so already, the very 
existence of those two fields disproves, at least beyond a certain point, 
an assertion such as: “Having many precise rules ‘reduce[s] the cost of 
organizing and communicating information for use in resolving legal 
disputes.’”110 
Tax and employee benefits law, and by extension all the other heavily 
detailed, prescriptive rules that characterize much of the modern 
regulatory state,111 tend instead to validate H. L. A. Hart’s view: 
[W]e should not cherish, even as an ideal, the conception of a rule so 
detailed that the question whether it applied or not to a particular case 
was always settled in advance, and never involved, at the point of 
actual application, a fresh choice between open alternatives.  Put 
 
108. See Colliton, supra note 50, at 288 (noting that “the specificity of the statute did not 
reduce the number of cases before the courts”); Manning, Conservation of Ambiguity, supra note 
49, at 11 (“Elaboration in drafting does not result in reduced ambiguity.”).  See also Gordon D. 
Henderson, Controlling Hyperlexis—The Most Important “Law and . . . ,” 43 TAX LAW. 177, 
187–90 (1989) (describing the many issues the highly elaborative section 382 regulations 
nonetheless left unanswered).  
109. The present Article could be regarded as nothing more than a restatement of Manning’s 
“Conservation of Ambiguity” thesis—see generally Manning, Conservation of Ambiguity, supra 
note 49—the additional objectives hereof being merely to: (1) phrase Manning’s position in 
slightly different terms with the help of possibly pertinent mathematical analogies, (2) situate the 
issue in its larger jurisprudential context, and (3) marvel that Manning’s observations have been 
so completely ignored by rule writers and their audiences. 
110. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 27, at 266.  These writers acknowledge only the costs of 
writing and changing detailed rules.  Id. at 267, 278.  To be sure, writing thousands of pages of 
Code and regulations is costly, and that cost is yet another reason to avoid such detail, but such 
promulgation costs are surely dwarfed by the costs, to millions of taxpayers and their advisors, of 
accessing the resulting provisions. 
111. Many have suggested that the overall tendency of all modern law is toward the 
elaborative style that now characterizes the U.S. tax code.  See, e.g., Colliton, supra note 50, at 
329; Cranston, supra note 60, at 885–86.  Professor Schauer has observed that even national 
constitutions seem to be getting longer.  Frederick Schauer, The Failure of the Common Law, 36 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 765, 766–67 (2004).  Schauer calls this movement toward elaboration 
“precisification,” id. at 768; Holmes, a “process of specification”—i.e., a “tendency of law to 
become more and more concrete.”  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 112–13 
(1881). 
2_STUMPFF 3/9/2013  1:32 PM 
680 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  44 
shortly, the reason is that the necessity for such choice is thrust upon 
us because we are men, not gods . . . .  [W]e labour under two 
connected handicaps whenever we seek to regulate, unambiguously 
and in advance, some sphere of conduct . . . .  The first handicap is our 
relative ignorance of fact; the second is our relative indeterminacy of 
aim.  If the world in which we live were characterized only by a finite 
number of features, and these together with all the modes in which 
they could combine were known to us, then provision could be made 
in advance for every possibility . . . .  Plainly this world is not our 
world; human legislators can have no such knowledge of all the 
possible combinations of circumstances which the future may 
bring.112 
One of the architects of the modern tax regime, Stanley Surrey, was 
pessimistic about the prospects for improvement: 
The inescapable conclusion from [a] survey of the causes of our 
present tax complexity is that a very large amount of complexity is 
inevitable, and that the degree of the complexity will probably 
increase rather than decrease.  The solution thus does not lie in any 
“simplification” of the tax law.  Nor does it lie in a nostalgic search 
for the “simpler” Internal Revenue Code that is simpler solely because 
it avoids many of the structural problems that require an answer.  The 
challenge of the future in the tax field is not the attainment of such 
simplification.  Rather, the challenge lies in finding the most efficient 
way for the management of tax complexity.113 
In one sense, there is reason to be even more pessimistic than 
Surrey.114  The problem he described is not, as he assumed, specific to 
the U.S. income tax system, but rather is an inherent potential issue with 
any rule system.  On the other hand, notwithstanding Surrey, it does not 
necessarily have to be an inevitably crippling problem even in the tax 
context, but instead could, at least in theory, be ameliorated by, among 
other things, paying attention to rule style.115  Surrey was surely 
 
112. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 9, at 125. 
113. Surrey, supra note 35, at 708–09 (emphasis added). 
114. Upon Surrey, it must be said, has been pinned some of the blame for the elaborative 
complexity of contemporary American tax law.  Miller, supra note 32, at 6 n.21.  Surrey 
identified a number of reasons for thinking of tax law as uniquely susceptible of complexity—
including its system of annual computation, progressive rates, multiple categories of taxable 
“character,” and legislative use of the tax code to promote social ends—some, though not all, of 
which he regarded as unavoidable.  Surrey, supra note 35, at 673–76.  To similar effect, see 
Bittker, supra note 77, at 2–3; Miller, supra note 32, at 7–8 n.25. 
115. An analysis of rule styles that strike a better balance between specificity and 
accessibility, in particular focusing on the device of employing “safe harbors,” will be the subject 
of a future article.  The safe harbor (or “unsafe harbor”) construction combines a general, vague 
principle with a few more precise rules intended to specify the outcome of those situations 
expected to arise most frequently.  Though not a magic bullet, it generally seems to produce a 
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entirely justified in his pessimism, however, so long as everyone 
accepts, as he seemed to, that the proper goal in writing rules is to 
account in advance for every single case. 
A difference between law and mathematics or the physical sciences is 
that we will never be able to create definite, determinate formulas, like 
Newton’s laws of motion, for writing or interpreting legal rules.116  
Rules govern, are the product of, and are interpreted by a process 
involving unremittingly variable and unpredictable human behavior.  
But it does seem worthwhile for rule writers to attempt to take 
accessibility into account, with due regard for what is known and has 
long been known about what does and does not “work.”117 
And style consequences can have policy consequences.  At least 
some political and public antipathy to excessive “government 
regulation” may really be founded in complaints about 
micromanagement and simple accessibility.  If that is so, we might 
promote progressive objectives by being more mindful of rule style.  It 
would be unfortunate—perhaps even tragic—for substantive societal 
objectives to be abandoned in consequence of a quest for certainty that 
can, demonstrably, never succeed. 
 
more viable result than simple enumeration.  Safe harbor rules bear structural similarity to the 
common law, which has not struck observers as “complex” in the way the tax code is complex.  
See generally Peter Swire, Safe Harbors and a Proposal to Improve the Community Reinvestment 
Act, 79 VA. L. REV. 349 (1993).  It should also be emphasized that the inevitability of some hard 
cases—because of the fractal quality of every rule—does not mean the number of hard cases 
cannot in practice be minimized by the selection and drafting of a well-conceived rule.  (An 
observation made by Professor Maher, who is pursuing similar ideas in his own work.)  For the 
present, I am only concerned with pointing out that complete elaboration is futile and should not 
be attempted; and therefore we must all be willing to accept and even prefer some rule vagueness.  
In doing so, I join others who have offered the same heuristic suggestion.  See Miller, supra note 
32, at 5 (“This Article is intended to bolster the trend toward general rules.”); id. at 4 n.14 
(quoting Secretary for Tax Policy Fred T. Goldberg, Jr.) (“General principles are often better than 
detailed rules.”); Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, supra note 48, at 779–80 (“The 
time has come when a balance between generality and hand-tailoring must be struck nearer to the 
former.  We must learn to legislate by approximation.”). 
116. Despite the apparent hopes of some, such as Ehrlich and Posner, and other Law and 
Economics theorists.  For a related idea, see Robert S. Summers, A Note on Symbolic Logic and 
the Law, 13 J. LEGAL EDUC. 486 (1961), a devastating critique of Layman Allen’s attempt to 
apply the principles of symbolic logic to rule writing.  On the other hand, certain authors have 
gone so far as effectively to suggest that it is illegitimate—somehow off-limits—for legal writers 
to draw upon science or math, even by way of analogy.  See Dow, supra note 1, at 715.  This 
position seems ridiculous.  See Lipshaw, supra note 1, at 43 (“[A]nalogies . . . cannot possibly 
fall within the authority of one discipline or another.”). 
117. In so doing, the rule writers would be accepting Roscoe Pound’s long-ago “challenge to 
lawyers . . . to study the social operation of legislation, the effects it produces, and the means of 
making it effective.”  Cranston, supra note 60, at 907 (citing POUND, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 
58, at 350–55). 
